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Abstract: In his youth, John Stuart 
Mill followed his father’s philoso-
phy of persuasion but, in 1830, Mill 
adopted a new philosophy of persua-
sion, trying to lead people incremen-
tally towards the truth from their 
original stand-points rather than en-
gage them antagonistically. Under-
standing this change helps us under-
stand apparent contradictions in 
Mill’s canon, as he disguises some 
of his more radical ideas in order to 
bring his audience to re-assess and 
authentically change their opinions. 
It also suggests a way of re-
assessing the relationship between 
Mill’s public and private works, to 
which we should look if we are at-
tempting to understand his thought.  
 
Résumé: Dans sa jeunesse, John 
Stuart Mill a suivi la philosophie de 
la persuasion de son père, mais en 
1830 Mill a adopté une nouvelle 
philosophie de la persuasion en es-
sayant d'amener les gens progressi-
vement vers la vérité à partir de leur 
perspective plutôt que communiquer 
de manière antagoniste. Comprendre 
ce changement nous aide à com-
prendre les contradictions apparentes 
dans l’œuvre de Mill, car il déguise 
certaines de ses idées les plus radi-
cales pour amener son auditoire à 
réévaluer et changer authentique-
ment leurs opinions. Comprendre ce 
changement suggère aussi une façon 
de réévaluer la relation entre les tra-
vaux publics et privés de Mill, que 
nous devons examiner si nous es-
sayons de comprendre sa pensée. 
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Throughout his life John Stuart Mill wrote primarily for a public 
audience, with the intent of affecting political outcomes through 
mobilising public opinion either to bring weight to bear on 
elected politicians, or to change social mores.
1
 Mill’s writings 
are then, in the main, persuasive texts. It is generally recognised 
amongst modern readers and scholars that Mill was not writing 
analytical philosophy in the ways of today’s political philoso-
phers, but I do not think we have quite understood what Mill’s 
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 This article is substantially based on a paper delivered at the ISUS X con-
ference at Berkeley in 2008. My thanks to the AHRC for helping fund my 
attendance and research.  
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persuasive project was, and thus run the risk of reading him 
wrong.
2
 In this article I wish to offer a way of understanding 
Mill’s philosophy of persuasion (and how that changed during 
his lifetime) in order that we may gain a greater understanding 
not only of what he wrote, but also why he wrote it in that way.  
In his youth, Mill’s philosophy of persuasion was, like the 
political theory of which it formed a part, aligned with his fa-
ther’s. This persuasive philosophy had two prongs: repeating 
rational arguments until people were forced to see their truth, 
and thus assent to them, and educating people so that they asso-
ciated the right things with pleasure, and the wrong things with 
pain (Mill 1981, 109; Hamburger 1963, 25; James Mill 1825, 
12-14). However, one of the outcomes of Mill’s famous ‘crisis’ 
in 1826/7 was his adoption of an almost entirely different phi-
losophy of persuasion, based on trying to bring people, from 
their own standpoints, to change their views incrementally until 
they had better opinions, which they had formed for themselves. 
In order to help people make these incremental changes, Mill 
changed his philosophy of persuasion from challenging his 
readers directly with rational arguments, to revealing his own 
opinions in an equally incremental manner, depending on how 
he judged public opinion at the time, and what changes he could 
justifiably expect to bring about. The realisation that this is how 
Mill chose to argue, coupled with the fact that almost all of his 
texts are aimed at persuading his readers, means that we need to 
bear in mind whom Mill considered to be his audience, what 
change he might have been trying to bring about, and the con-
text within which he was arguing (which reveals how radical he 
felt he could afford to be) whenever we read any of Mill’s 
works: the immediate content of his writing after 1826/7 does 
not reveal everything about his political theory.  
 In this article I wish to put forward this argument in the 
following manner. Firstly, by assessing James Mill’s philosophy 
of persuasion as Mill understood it, and as Mill engaged in it 
when he first began writing persuasive pieces (in the 1820s), 
                                                         
2
 Good work has been done on explaining what rhetorical devices Mill em-
ployed in particular texts, for instance Margaret Canovan’s analysis of Mill’s 
creation of a particular authorial voice in On Liberty. It is the different, fur-
ther question of why he did this—his philosophy of persuasion, not the par-
ticular methods he utilised in particular texts—with which I am interested 
here (Canovan, 505-15). Similarly, Frederick Rosen’s discussion of Mill’s 
use of dichotomy to show both sides of a question is related to my under-
standing of Mill’s philosophy of persuasion, though Rosen does not explain 
why Mill had such a philosophy (or ‘method of reform’), nor exactly what it 
was (Rosen, 69 and 231-2).  
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secondly, by examining how Mill’s attitude to this philosophy of 
persuasion changed after his famed mental ‘crisis’ of 1826/7, 
thirdly, by identifying how Mill’s philosophy of persuasion 
changed in the light of his crisis, and lastly illustrating this with 
a brief examination of the light it sheds on some apparent con-
tradictions in Mill’s feminism.  
 
 
2. Mill’s philosophy of persuasion in the early 1820s 
 
In his Autobiography, Mill categorises the 1820s as the period 
of his ‘most extreme Benthamism’ (Mill 1981a, 137). The phi-
losophy of persuasion in which Mill was engaged as a part of 
championing Benthamite radicalism was an important part of his 
political thought at the time. Both were based (in part) on his 
father’s political thought, and on ‘associationist psychology’, a 
school of philosophy of mind based on the work of David Hart-
ley, which James Mill extended or re-founded with his Analysis 
of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (Mill 1981a, 107-9 and 
590; Mill 1989, 99; Hamburger 1963, 25; Hugeulet 1966, xii). 
 Associationist psychology had a great deal of bearing on 
the philosophy of persuasion adopted by James Mill in the early 
1800s (Mill 1981a, 109; Hamburger 1963, 25). One aspect of 
this—and the aspect most shared by John Stuart Mill at that 
time—was to repeat rational arguments over and over again un-
til people were forced to both rationally, and practically, assent 
to them (Mill 1981a, 590 and 109; Mill 1989, 99; Hamburger 
1963, 25; Hugeulet 1966, xii).  
 To explain the basis of this philosophy of persuasion, we 
must look a little closer at associationist psychology. James Mill 
and Hartley held that all our ideas, sensations and ‘internal Feel-
ings’ (such as, importantly, conscience), come from outside our 
bodies, and are all attended by either pleasure or pain (Hartley, 
ii; Mill 1981, 590; Hugeulet, xii; James Mill 1869, esp. 52 and 
70-126). As all our ideas about morality come from external 
stimuli, then it must be the different institutions under which 
men live, which give them their ideas of morality. Hence, if we 
change institutions, we can change men. Similarly, one way of 
‘persuading’ people to do something is to train them to associate 
doing it with pleasure (and not doing it, or doing something bad, 
with pain). (Additionally, for James Mill, as this theory of psy-
chology shows that the only internal thing which unites all hu-
manity is the seeking of pleasure and the aversion to pain, Utili-
tarianism becomes the only rational and justifiable foundation 
for all human institutions.)  
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 In order to change institutions (and thus change men), one 
has to get those people who can change the law to agree to 
changes, and this is where the second prong of James Mill’s phi-
losophy of persuasion comes in. Hartley argued that once we see 
the truth of propositions, we cannot but rationally assent to them 
(Hartley, 324). Repeated rational assent to something forces us 
to also give it our practical assent (Hartley, 324-5). This is im-
portant as it is this form of assent that makes us ready to act 
upon the beliefs we have assented to—rational assent is not 
enough in itself (ibid.). The more we are confronted with a truth, 
to which we must rationally assent, the more we are forced also 
to assent practically, and thus to act upon it (ibid.).  
 Like Hartley, James Mill believed that association was 
made stronger by repetition (James Mill 1869, 87). Although he 
accepted that some people carried on associating ideas (such as 
ghosts with the dark) even when they did not really believe in 
the truth of the idea anymore, James Mill also thought that new 
associations, leading to the recognition of new truths, could 
bring about new beliefs (James Mill 1869, 87).
3
  
 It is for this reason that, as Mill records, his father had 
‘almost unbounded confidence’ in ‘complete freedom of discus-
sion’ (Mill 1981a, 109): free and public discussion brings new 
truths to people’s attention, which they have no choice but to 
accept, and, eventually, such free discussion will also change 
their behaviour and make them act on those propositions (and 
will, eventually, if united with representative government 
elected by universal suffrage be the best means of ensuring good 
government) (ibid).  
 In brief, James Mill’s philosophy of persuasion had two 
strands. Firstly, he believed that one could train people, through 
the association of pleasure and pain, to seek certain things and 
avoid others. For example, he felt that the pain of public disap-
probation could prevent people from having too many children, 
as could the pleasure of public approbation at their self-control 
(James Mill 1826, 58-9). Secondly, he believed that repeated 
rational argument could force people to accept the truth of a 
statement.  
 James Mill’s practical action on this aspect of persuasion 
is to be seen in his belief that newspapers had to highlight the 
ills of government, and keep repeating them (Hamburger 1963, 
25). It seems plausible that John Stuart Mill adopted this same 
                                                         
3
 Interestingly, James Mill may have had Jeremy Bentham in mind when he 
talked about men who feared ghosts though they did not believe in them 
(Schofield, 1).  
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attitude towards bringing about reform just as he adopted almost 
all of his father’s political, social, economic and philosophical 
thought at this period. Certainly, Mill wrote a number of articles 
on much the same topic during the 1820s, for example, nine on 
religious tolerance and libel laws in the space of two years, and 
his belief in the power of repeating rationally-acceptable truths 
would be a credible explanation of this (Mill 1986, 6, 9-15, 21-
5, 30-34, 42, 46-8, and 91-5). 
 In sum, then, I contend that in the 1820s, when Mill first 
began to write texts which were aimed at persuading public 
opinion, his persuasive philosophy was aligned with his father’s, 
and, in particular, being based on the principles of associationist 
psychology, was concerned with one particular aspect of his fa-
ther’s method, that of confronting the public with rational argu-
ments, and repeating them until people had to acknowledge the 
truth of them, and were forced to give their assent. I also con-
tend that this philosophy of persuasion changed dramatically 
during the years following Mill’s crisis of 1826/7, as he rejected 
both aspects of his father’s philosophy of persuasion, as the fol-
lowing section will endeavour to show.  
 
 
3. Mill’s philosophy of persuasion after his mental ‘crisis’ 
 
In the winter of 1826/7, Mill suffered what he refers to in his 
Autobiography as a ‘crisis in [his] mental history’ in which his 
faith in the Benthamite project of reform crumbled (Mill 1981a, 
137-45). I believe a part of Mill’s rejection of his previous Ben-
thamism was a rejection of his old way of trying to change pub-
lic opinion, and his adoption of a different philosophy of persua-
sion.  
 Mill’s rejection is closely connected to an increasing con-
cern with the ‘naturalness’ or authenticity of ideas – that is, 
Mill’s desire that feelings and opinions be born of something 
inside a person, and not moulded onto them by some outside 
force, an aspect of his crisis to which I will turn in more detail 
below. This led to the following six reasons for doubting the ef-
ficacy of his father’s philosophy of persuasion. Firstly, Mill 
doubted that people could be brought to change the world 
through educating them to associate ‘virtue’, or the right ideas, 
with pleasure, and ‘vice’, or the wrong ideas, with pain because 
these resulting associations would be artificial (Mill 1981a, 
141). Secondly, he came to believe that the associations support-
ing these artificial feelings were prone to being destroyed by our 
powers of analysis (ibid.). Thirdly, he believed that only authen-
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tic (inartificial) opinions, which were attached to and supported 
by real, authentic, feelings, could command our practical assent, 
and hence action (ibid.). These three reasons are all primarily 
associated with his father’s belief that one way of persuading 
people to accept or reject an idea was to train them to associate 
pleasure or pain with it. Fourthly, Mill realised that debate only 
made people cling more strongly to their erroneous beliefs. 
Fifthly, he determined that no one’s opinions were wholly cor-
rect, or wholly wrong. Sixthly, he came to believe that critical 
debate was one of the symptoms of the deeper problems of his 
time, problems that could partly be cured by a movement away 
from this kind of critical thinking. These latter three reasons are 
all primarily connected with his father’s method of persuading 
people through repeated restatement of one’s rational beliefs, 
which Mill had himself also engaged in. In order to better un-
derstand how and why Mill rejected his father’s philosophy of 
persuasion, in which he himself had engaged in the 1820s, I will 
next examine each of these six points more closely.  
 To begin, then, my first point is that Mill determined that 
opinions founded on associations of pleasure and pain were arti-
ficial and inauthentic. The belief that people could be brought to 
associate the ‘right’ things with pleasure and the ‘wrong’ with 
pain was the basis of James Mill’s educational system (James 
Mill 1825, 12-14). This need not be as simple or direct as caus-
ing someone pain when they do something bad—for example, 
Mill’s knowledge of Greek and Latin, and admiration for Greeks 
and Romans, was used to foster support for democracy in mod-
ern times—though this seems to have formed part of it (Mill 
1981a, 23; Mill 1981c, 612-13). This educational and persuasive 
method may also be the root of why Mill recalls his conscience 
always spoke to him in his father’s voice, for it was his father’s 
early training in associating certain actions with ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ that gave him his earliest moral code (Mill 1981c, 613). 
 In 1826/7 Mill declared that his father’s system of educa-
tion, even when it worked, led only to ‘artificial’ associations 
(Mill 1981a, 141). We can be forced, especially through pain, to 
aver something, but that aversion is only grounded in our aver-
sion to pain, and not in any real understanding of why we should 
avoid the actual action itself (ibid.). Mill determined that what 
he called the ‘old … instruments’ of ‘praise and blame, reward 
and punishment’ (his father’s preferred methods) resulted in 
ideas being associated with either pleasure or pain artificially, 
and not through any ‘natural tie’ (ibid.). People may well be 
malleable, and the institutions his father wished to see created 
might well have formed people’s characters in such a way as 
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they associated virtuous things with pleasure, and vicious things 
with pain, but this meant that people would only do a virtuous 
thing for the pleasurable reward, or refrain from doing a vicious 
thing because they feared the resulting pain, and not because 
they felt they should be virtuous and not vicious.  
 I suggest we call this problem Mill’s concern for natural-
ness, or authenticity—for feelings to be born of something in-
side a person, and not moulded onto them by some outside 
force. Naturalness, inartificiality, self-creation and authenticity 
were certainly things with which Mill was much concerned at 
this period, being very distressed by the idea that he was a man 
‘manufactured’ or ‘made’ by his father and incapable of having 
his own, self-generated, authentic, opinions (Mill 1981d, 132). 
Indeed, in 1833 he wrote that it was far more important that 
people had authentic feelings and opinions than that these opin-
ions were true or right (Mill 1981e, 369). Mill seems to have 
believed that what was important were opinions which were 
born of a man’s very nature, and gave us knowledge of his indi-
vidual character at the deepest level (ibid.). He was also highly 
concerned that things really were felt by people, from deep 
within, even going so far as to say that knowing that other peo-
ple really feel, and having sympathy for their ability to feel, is 
what makes the difference between living life, and getting 
through it, not least because the knowledge that there has been 
nobleness and great feeling in the world inspires us to the strug-
gle to achieve them ourselves (Mill 1981e, 369-70). Again, the 
emphasis is on real feelings, coming from an individual’s own 
soul—from the very depth of their being—and on individual ex-
perience. Simply because authenticity is of paramount impor-
tance, then, Mill rejected his father’s attempts to train people to 
associate pain and pleasure with the ‘right’ opinions, because 
this approach did not create authentic opinions.  
 The problem of authenticity also led to Mill’s rejection of 
his father’s philosophy of persuasion for a second reason; such 
opinions were prone to destruction by our own powers of analy-
sis. Mill believed, as already mentioned, that his father’s meth-
ods only engendered artificial associations. Mill also believed 
(from his own experience) that these artificial associations were 
prone to being broken down by our powers of analysis (Mill 
1981a, 141). This is because analysis, which is a natural part of 
anyone’s mental make-up, but is also encouraged and strength-
ened by rational argument, enables us to separate ideas, however 
long we have been trained to consider them as indistinguishable 
(ibid.). Hence, although Mill still believed that analysis can help 
us see the real connections between cause and effect, or between 
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things joined by natural laws, he realised that the habit of analy-
sis would destroy all virtue founded solely on associations of 
feeling (Mill 1981a, 141-3). Mill concluded that he had no real 
desire to see the reforms for which he had once been a standard-
bearer achieved, for he could feel no authentic connection be-
tween that achievement and his own happiness (Mill 1981a, 
143). As Mill puts it ‘[t]he end had ceased to charm … how 
could there ever again be any interest in the means?’ (ibid). His 
commitment to these reforms had been based entirely on associ-
ating them with pleasure, and not in any authentic belief in 
them—once that association was broken, so, in the darkest pe-
riod of his ‘crisis’, was all belief in the reforms themselves. 
Moreover, although Mill regained his commitment to many 
radical reforms, and campaigned for them for the rest of his life, 
this commitment was not founded on his attachment of the per-
sonal experience of pleasure to their achievement, as he had 
done in the 1820s. Mill’s crisis made him realise that his father’s 
philosophy of persuasion, therefore, although it might work in 
the short-term, in the long-term led to disillusionment and de-
spair. Worse, it was one aspect of his father’s method—that of 
repeating rational arguments—which would, by strengthening 
our reason and powers of analysis, undermine the education 
brought about by the other aspect, that of training people to as-
sociate good things with pleasure, and bad things with pain. His 
father’s philosophy of persuasion was, then, ultimately self-
defeating.  
 This leads me to Mill’s third problem with his father’s 
philosophy of persuasion, that only those opinions which are 
authentically ours can command our action. This is the corollary 
of what Mill discovered in himself in his ‘mental crisis’; the 
ends ceased the charm, and thus so did acting to achieve the 
means. If we are attached to the ends only through training, 
therefore, when our analysis attacks this attachment and de-
stroys it, we will no longer pursue either it, or the means to it. 
But when the end had ‘charmed’, Mill had been an active and 
vociferous pursuer of the means. Hence, I contend, he deter-
mined that if we could have a natural, authentic attachment to 
the end, we would pursue the means. If one wants to persuade 
people to pursue institutional change, therefore, one must elicit 
an authentic emotional attachment to the reforms one proposes 
in order to get people to act upon them.  
 As I noted above, Mill had been concerned that people 
avoiding a certain course of action due to their associating either 
pleasure or pain with it, was both unsustainable (as their powers 
of analysis would break these bonds of association and destroy 
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the original motivating force which led them to action), and 
wrong (as it lead to artificial, or inauthentic, opinions, and not 
natural, authentic ones). This new idea, although based in utili-
tarianism, and hence on seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, is 
not doing the same thing. Mill had a problem with people avoid-
ing a certain action because they had been trained to expect a 
painful response when they followed it, or following a course of 
action because they had been trained to expect a pleasurable re-
sponse from it, rather as one trains animals. However, he still 
believed that we do indeed follow certain courses of action be-
cause they result in pleasure, and desist from following others 
because they result in pain, but Mill wanted that feeling of either 
pleasure of pain to be more intrinsically attached to the action 
that his father’s educational plans. So, for example, one can 
imagine that one might train someone to always offer their seat 
on the bus to someone in more need of a seat by punishing them 
if they did not offer their seat. We can categorise this as James 
Mill’s attitude. John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, wants people 
to offer their seats to those in greater need because that is the 
right thing to do, and they would, themselves, feel bad if they 
did not do the right thing.  
 This prompting conscience could also be the result of in-
authentic training, as Mill himself notes. He criticises himself 
for relying too heavily on his father for his moral responsibili-
ties, and not shouldering them himself (Mill 1981c, 613). How-
ever, conscience could evidently also be authentic, so long as, to 
borrow Mill’s metaphor, it speaks with our own voice, and not 
that of our trainer (ibid.). The difference is between doing some-
thing because someone external will reward you, and doing 
something because one’s own feelings lead one inexorably to-
wards it. In the first case, being brought by our powers of analy-
sis to realise that we only do the ‘good’ thing because we have 
been trained to do it will sap our motivation to ever do it again, 
because we do not, ourselves, authentically believe that it is 
good – we are only authentically attracted to either the reward or 
to avoid the punishment. Mill’s preferred form of motivation, 
however, relies on us having an authentic belief in the goodness 
of an action which is not dependent on the pleasure or a reward 
for doing it, or the pain of punishment for not doing it. This kind 
of motivation is free from the destructive power of analysis, be-
cause analysis will only help us see more clearly why this par-
ticular action will help us achieve an end we have already 
agreed is good (this is particularly useful for Mill, as he is a con-
sequentialist). Thus, analysis actually strengthens the motivation 
as it is easier for us to see which the right course of action is.  




© Helen McCabe. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 38-61. 
 
 In sum, then, Mill lost faith not in associationist psychol-
ogy, but in the premises drawn by both Hartley and his father 
from the belief that all our ideas come from outside ourselves 
and are ‘associated’ in our mind. He believed that ideas and 
goals to which we are attached merely through being trained to 
associate them with pleasure are under attack from our powers 
of analysis. Partly because of this, partly because we will only 
act upon things which our emotions motivate us to act upon, and 
partly because Mill attached an independent importance to au-
thenticity, he rejected that aspect of his father’s philosophy of 
persuasion which relied on bringing people to associate certain 
ideas with pleasure and others with pain. These three reasons are 
not, however, the only ones because of which Mill rejected his 
father’s persuasive methods. I will now, therefore, turn to an ex-
amination of the other three.  
 Fourth on my initial list is the problem Mill identified with 
argumentative debate – namely, that it made people cling more 
stubbornly to their original opinions. Mill seems to have gener-
ated this idea after being drawn to some of the ideas of the Col-
eridgeans he debated at the London Debating Society (indeed, 
one can discern a Romantic influence in Mill’s concern for au-
thenticity discussed above) (Mill 1981a, 159-63).  
 The Coleridgeans felt themselves (and were felt by many 
Benthamites) to be in complete opposition to Benthamism and, 
in the heat of debate between Mill and the Coleridgean John 
Sterling (and presumably in the desire for victory) Mill felt that 
both he and Sterling had gone too far in abusing each other’s 
views; it led to Sterling’s resignation from the Society, and, Mill 
feared, to the ending of their friendship (Mill 1981d, 162; Mill, 
1963a, 29). This prompted Mill to write a contrite letter to Ster-
ling, insisting that he was ‘resolved hereafter to avoid all occa-
sions for debate, since they cannot now strengthen my sympa-
thies with those who agree with me, & are sure to weaken them 
with those who differ’ (Mill 1963a, 30). Indeed, Mill seems to 
have begun to believe that all argumentative debate only made 
people, through misplaced pride, cling to their existing beliefs 
(Mill 1963b, 46). This problem was compounded by the fact that 
argumentative debate made people associate changing their 
mind with the feeling of defeat, and hence he determined to 
abandon it (ibid.). Mill felt this problem so strongly that he re-
signed his membership of the London Debating Society which 
he had been instrumental in founding only a few years before. 
Such a rejection of head-on debate is a complete rejection of 
Mill’s father’s persuasive method, which was all about argu-
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mentative debate with rational argument, and forcing people to 
see the truth, and thus the correct nature, of ones own opinions. 
 In addition, Mill took this problem with debate even fur-
ther, and also eschewed the idea of ‘sectarianism’, which he felt 
promoted the spirit of debate, even when argumentative debate 
was not happening. Before his ‘crisis’ Mill had been happy to 
identify himself as a Utilitarian and as a ‘philosophical radical’. 
After his crisis, he determined to no longer be seen as an ‘advo-
cate’ either for, or against, any cause (ibid.). This, similarly, is a 
rejection of his previous method of debate, which was con-
cerned with being ‘sectarian’ and promulgating a set of beliefs 
identified with the sect to which one belonged in opposition to 
the other, erroneous, ideas abounding in society.  
 Mill’s experience at the London Debating Society is also 
instrumental in the fifth reason I gave above for his rejection of 
his father’s philosophy of persuasion, namely a determination 
that no one’s opinions were wholly correct, or wholly wrong. 
This also flies in the face of his father’s methods of persuasion, 
which brooked little self-doubt or discussion. During his ‘crisis’, 
however, Mill determined that the greatest danger to society was 
of people being too partial in their views, going so far as to de-
clare that ‘no powers of mind are any protection against the 
evils arising from imperfect and partial views’ (Mill 1963c, 42).  
 Apart from the question of women’s suffrage, Mill’s pre-
vious thought had been almost identical to his father’s (and 
Mill’s position on women’s enfranchisement was the same as 
Bentham’s, so it was hardly too-radical a departure) (Mill 
1981a, 133). As a part of this, both Mills, in the 1820s, despised 
Tories, aristocrats, and all others not in favour of their pro-
gramme of reform (ibid.). The thought that anyone from one of 
these opposing camps might have something to contribute, 
never mind might have a portion of the truth on their side, was 
anathema (ibid.). Yet this was exactly what Mill was saying; 
and, moreover, he was admitting that his own ideas were not a 
hundred percent correct. More even than declaring that one’s 
opponents might have something to say for their point of view, 
Mill turned away from the very idea of being sectarian, and de-
termined rather that one should be in search of many-sidedness. 
His father’s philosophy of persuasion, therefore, which relied on 
the arguments put forward being true, and also, on opponent’s 
arguments being wrong, did not fit in with this new realisation 
that there could be some truth on both sides of an argument, and 
had to be rejected.  
 I come now to my sixth and final point, that critical debate 
was one of the symptoms of the deeper problems of Mill’s time, 
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problems that could partly be cured by a movement away from 
this kind of antagonistic thinking. This is also probably the most 
complicated point to make, encompassing as it does a number of 
changes not only to Mill’s ideas about persuasion, but also to his 
wider political theory.  
 One aspect of Mill’s movement away from his father was 
his repudiation of his father’s philosophy of history, a shift 
which was triggered by Thomas Macaulay’s attack on James 
Mill’s historicity in his Essay on Government, and by James 
Mill’s response to this, which Mill found unsatisfying (Mill 
1981a, 165-7). From this dissatisfaction, and through his reading 
of Saint-Simon and the Saint-Simonians, Mill began to think 
that institutions should be judged in three different ways: which 
institutions would be theoretically guaranteed to generate the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number; what was best the 
time could have produced; and which institutions best aided the 
progress of their age. Thus, for instance, representative democ-
racy with universal suffrage was right for now, without doubt. It 
was also, without doubt, a better kind of society than a non-
democratic one, but that was not to say that feudalism ‘may … 
have not only been highly useful but absolutely indispensable; 
the only means by which the human mind could have been 
brought forward to an ulterior stage of improvement’ and thus, 
the right and most progressive kind of society for the Middle 
Ages (and argument which echoes Saint-Simon’s writings on 
monasteries, which are not suitable for modern times, but were 
highly useful in the Middle Ages, furthering all sorts of social 
progress such as draining land, founding hospitals, making the 
laity literate, and deciphering ancient manuscripts) (Mill 1981a, 
167; Mill, 1986 257 and 305-6; Mill 1963c, 41; Saint-Simon 
1952, 15). This is tantamount to a direct condemnation of his 
father’s own attitude to history, and reasoning in the social sci-
ences, and marks an important departure from his own earlier 
political thought, as well as confirming to Mill that one side—
and particularly his father’s side—of the argument was not 
guaranteed to be completely correct and that, therefore, his phi-
losophy of persuasion was incorrect.  
 As well as adopting the Saint-Simonian attitude to judging 
historical social institutions, Mill also adopted from them a new 
vision of history as moving between ‘organic periods’ of social 
stability, and ‘periods of transition’ or ‘critical’ ages, where so-
cial stability, and social institutions, were being broken down, 
ideas he drew from Saint-Simon, Comte (who was a Saint-
Simonian at this time), and from Mill’s close friend Gustave 
d’Eichthal (Mill, 1981a 171-3; Mill, 1963c 42; Mill 1986, 227-
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35, 238-46, 252-8, 278-83, 289-95, 304-7 and 312-17; 
d’Eichthal, 11; Saint-Simon 1976, 187). This idea is also key to 
his determination of what was wrong with his father’s philoso-
phy of persuasion.  
 In order to help clarify this idea of organic and critical pe-
riods, Mill presents as examples of organic epochs the periods in 
Greek and Roman history when the pantheon of gods was really 
believed in, and similarly the mediaeval period when people 
really believed in justification of the spiritual and temporal 
power of the Catholic Church (Mill 1981a, 171). For critical pe-
riods he offers the Greece of the Greek philosophers and the 
Reformation which, Mill argues, ushered in a critical period 
which ‘has lasted ever since, still lasts, and cannot altogether 
cease until a new organic periods has been inaugurated by the 
triumph of a yet more advanced creed’ (ibid.).  
 This change in Mill’s philosophy of history had a direct 
bearing on his attitude to his father’s philosophy of persuasion. 
Firstly, it confirmed Mill’s belief that there were many sides to 
an argument, and that an opinion, though it may be true now, is 
not necessarily eternally true: although James Mill was right to 
think that representative government was a better form of gov-
ernment than any that had gone before, and was also the best 
form of government for current society, it was still possible that 
there might be an even better way of governing, and that James 
Mill’s form of representative government was not necessarily 
the last word in human progress. Secondly, it gave Mill a tool 
for characterising his own period of history, understanding what 
was happening during it, and determining his own role within it.  
 Mill realised that he was living in a ‘critical’ age, where 
all opinions were up for grabs and there was no over-arching 
ideology in which everyone believed and which could provide 
social harmony. He further determined that argumentative de-
bate, in which neither side believed in the same (or indeed, any) 
higher authority to which they could appeal for an adjudication 
or justification was not only a symptom of a critical age, but was 
prolonging it (Mill 1963b, 46). He also insisted that he had ‘a 
great dislike of controversy, and am persuaded that discussion, 
as discussion, seldom did any good’ (Mill, 1963b 45). Mill con-
cluded that he was ‘unwilling to strengthen this spirit by main-
taining any opinions in the spirit of argumentation and debate’ 
(ibid.).  
Thus, Mill took from the Saint-Simonians, and his own 
discomfort with the dichotomy between his father and Macaulay 
on the role of history in social science, a belief that history is 
best understood as a progressive journey which moves between 
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organic and critical ages. As history had moved from the or-
ganic period of the Church-dominated Middle Ages through the 
critical period of the Reformation the end of which Mill felt 
himself to be living in, the goal was to bring society into a new 
organic period which would combine maximum progressiveness 
with social harmony (Mill 1981a, 173). ‘The spirit of argument 
and debate’ and ‘controversy’ were only prolonging this ‘criti-
cal’ period. Mill’s philosophy of persuasion in the early 1820s, 
which he had inherited from his father, was in just such a spirit. 
I contend, therefore, that Mill thus determined to abandon the 
philosophy of persuasion he had adopted in the early 1820s, and 
search for a method more suited to, and to creating, a new or-
ganic age. Mill had three reasons for this. Firstly, because, given 
his new understanding of history, an organic age was inevitable 
(ibid.). Secondly, because, given that inevitability, he wished to 
make it as desirable an age as possible—indeed, he seems to 
have believed that we might create the final organic age, after 
which ‘religious, ethical and political’ creeds would no longer 
‘require to be periodically thrown off and replaced by others’ 
(ibid.). Thirdly, because although he desired the freedom of 
thought and individual action so characteristic of a critical age, 
Mill also desired the ‘firm convictions as to right and wrong, 
useful and pernicious, deeply engrave on the feelings ... and well 
grounded in reason and the true exigencies of life’ which char-
acterise an organic age (ibid.).  
 For these six reasons, then, Mill rejected his father’s 
methods of persuasion: because they would only lead to artifi-
cial opinions and beliefs; because these opinions would be sus-
ceptible to being destroyed by our powers of analysis; because, 
therefore, no one would act on them; because debate only made 
people cling more strongly to their erroneous beliefs; because it 
made no allowance for his own opinions to be wrong; and be-
cause it was adding to the already existing problems of a critical 
age. What was needed was a return to an ‘organic’ age, with 
some sort of harmony and agreement about the basic fundamen-
tals of social institutions and morality (ibid.). This organic age 
would not be brought about by confrontational argument, but by 
engaging in some other philosophy of persuasion. It was this 
that Mill sought to devise during, and shortly after, his mental 
‘crisis’, writing to a friend that he had determined that it would 
be ‘one of the objects of my philosophical and practical labours 
… to contribute to the formation of a better spirit’ by engaging 
in public debate and persuasion in another way (Mill, 1963b, 
45). Mill explained what this new method would be in a series 
of letters to d’Eichthal in 1829 and 1830, and having analysed 
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what Mill rejected in his old philosophy of persuasion, I will 
now move onto an examination of his new method.  
 
 
4. Mill’s new philosophy of persuasion 
 
Mill’s new philosophy of persuasion was concerned with en-
gendering authentic opinions in people which were better than 
the ones they already had. In order to persuade people of things 
Mill had realised that argumentative confrontation was not the 
way forward, and had also realised that authenticity of opinions 
was both instrumentally and independently important. Thus, 
Mill hoped to bring people to new opinions by starting with the 
opinions they already had, and bringing them to change their 
minds little by little. As he himself put it, the route to everyone 
having better opinions was not to ‘attack their opinions en 
masse’ but rather to ‘fix our attention on what is good in those 
opinions, & endeavour to lead them on from this & through this 
to something better’ (Mill 1963b, 45).  
 Mill’s decision not to attack opinions stems most obvi-
ously from one of the problems he had with his old philosophy 
of persuasion—that it led to people clinging more stubbornly to 
their beliefs through a misplaced sense of pride, and to associate 
defeat with changing their mind. However, Mill also seems to 
have become concerned that if one tried to replace someone’s 
opinions en masse, these new opinions could not be authentic. 
He writes ‘you have done little or nothing for a man when you 
have merely given him an opinion’—what is important is for 
people to have authentic opinions which influence how they live 
their lives, and these cannot be replaced in one fell swoop 
(ibid.). Instead, Mill believed what was needed was to bring 
people to replace their own opinions little by little, saying that 
persuasion ‘should consist, not in attacking men’s wrong opin-
ions, but in giving them that knowledge which will enable them 
to form right ones that will push off the wrong ones, as the new 
leaves push off the withered ones of the last year’ (Mill, 1963c, 
42). This is because only authentic opinions (as noted above) 
will make men act. As Mill puts it, ‘[a]n opinion suggests hardly 
anything to an uninformed mind; it may become a watchword, 
but can never be a moving & influencing and living principle 
within him’ and it is only these living principles which will 
make people act for the better (ibid.).  
In implementing his new method, Mill appears to be try-
ing to walk a tightrope between two conflicting desires. Firstly, 
he wants to present people with the other side of the truth in 
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which they believe, yet secondly, he does not want to put their 
backs up with direct argument, for, as discussed above, this only 
has the effect of making them cling—out of misplaced pride—to 
partial, and hence erroneous, beliefs. I contend that, after his 
‘crisis’, Mill sought to solve this problem by incrementally re-
vealing to people as much of the truth he thought they had not 
seen as he thought they could stomach without becoming defen-
sive—though he did not intend merely to pander to their existing 
prejudices—and by trying to bring them to see for themselves 
the inconsistency or error of their existing opinions (what Rosen 
refers to as a ‘Socratic moment’) (Rosen, 45). Mill’s goal, then, 
was seriously to challenge people’s erroneous and partial be-
liefs, but in such a way as people would be able to accept the 
truth of his argument, or that the seeds of that truth would grow 
in their own minds without feeling that such a change of mind 
was a humiliating defeat. One of the outcomes of this plan for 
bringing about social reform is that Mill determined not just to 
lay out his own opinions, but to reveal them partially, to the ex-
tent that he felt his audience would, although challenged by 
them, also accept them. Mill had to do this because he believed 
that one had to begin with what people already believed, and get 
them to change their minds little by little, which was not achiev-
able by attacking their opinions en masse, by presenting them 
with a whole new way of thinking about the world, or a whole 
raft of proposed reforms. Rather, Mill was concerned to start 
with what was true in someone’s erroneous opinions, and, by 
ensuring they had grasped why that was true, slowly bring them 
to new, better, opinions. It would be self-defeating, therefore, of 
his persuasive texts to always reveal everything he believed, or 
every reform he hoped for – rather, he had to persuade people of 
the next step towards a better, truer, set of beliefs from their cur-
rent standing point, which might be a long way from Mill’s 
own.  
 This is not to argue that we should consider Mill’s texts as 
being ‘exoteric’—having one message for the uninformed 
reader, and a deeper, more meaningful and possibly even con-
tradictory message for the intelligent, careful, philosophical 
reader (Strauss, 36). I do not mean to argue that Mill felt pre-
vented from openly declaring his beliefs because of governmen-
tal persecution; or at least, I do not mean to argue that this is the 
best way of understand all of Mill’s texts. For example, although 
Mill himself admitted he kept his atheism mainly secret for fear 
that his works would simply not be read if he was thought to be 
an atheist, and also because of the fear of public ostracism or 
even legal penalty, and even went so far as to invoke Providence 
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and use other religious language in some of his works, and was 
particularly careful to defend the philosophes from the charge of 
‘irreligion’, his atheism is not ‘hidden’ in these works, nor to be 
read ‘between the lines’ of them (Mill 1981a, 41; Mill 1972a, 
491-2; Mill, 1967 26; Mill 1985, 66; Strauss 22-36).  
 Rather than governmental persecution, what Mill was 
concerned about was that he would simply not be listened to if 
he was too combative; and he felt that any form of direct, critical 
argument was too combative because it split men into camps 
and made them cling to their partial, erroneous beliefs out of 
pride. Hence, I contend that Mill determined not to reveal the 
full extent of his opinions on particular matters all at once, be-
cause he knew it would not be listened to. Instead, he allowed 
himself publicly to affirm so much of it as he thought would be 
accepted by (though still be a challenge to) contemporary soci-
ety; once they had seen the truth of part of his ideas, had authen-
tically accepted them, and had adjusted their own to them, then 
Mill would challenge them a little further with some other as-
pect of his thought.  
 It might be objected that what Mill has to say in On Lib-
erty castigating thinking men for hiding their thoughts might 
preclude him from having a philosophy of persuasion such as I 
am outlining (Mill 1977, 241-2). But it does not seem impossi-
ble that in Liberty Mill is criticising the weight of contemporary 
stigma on himself as much as on anyone else. Certainly it seems 
unlikely that Mill considered himself so completely economi-
cally and politically independent he could class himself amongst 
those who can afford to be brave, especially in earlier life.  
 Given this new understanding of Mill’s philosophy of per-
suasion, discovering what Mill’s complete set of ideas were be-
comes not an entirely straightforward endeavour. Rather, each 
of his texts is in some way a facet of his whole political thought. 
The task, then, is to try and piece together from what Mill does 
reveal in his texts, what this underlying political philosophy 
was, and especially at what kind of political and social reform 
Mill was aiming.  
 Importantly, as I noted at the very beginning of this piece, 
it is vital to note that a large number of Mill’s texts employ this 
philosophy of persuasion. This means, however, that any texts 
composed after around 1830 need to be read in the light of 
Mill’s new persuasive philosophy. In particular, I contend, this 
means that more weight than is often currently ascribed to pri-
vate texts needs to be given—where Mill is not engaged in an 
act of persuasion we are more likely to see more of his political 
thought, whereas his public and persuasive texts are likely only 
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to hold as much of the truths he held as he felt was useful to 
publish at the time. Indeed, Mill goes as far as to say that this is 
the case when he admits he did not publish something in support 
of the Northern States in the American Civil War when Britain 
seemed on the brink of war with them itself as ‘there was no 
chance of getting a hearing’ for it—that is, writing to express his 
support would only have alienated readers and been part of a 
destructive spirit of controversy, rather than helping to persuade 
the public to sympathise with the Northern cause (Mill, 1972b, 
733).  
 It must be noted, however, that not all of Mill’s private 
correspondence is non-persuasive, so the distinction between 
persuasive and non-persuasive is not as simple as that between 
public and private. Indeed, bearing in mind Mill’s recent com-
mitment to seeing both sides of the debate, and not tackling 
other people’s opinions head-on can help, I contend, make sense 
of some of his private correspondence when we realise that it, 
too, is often persuasive.  
 A good example of this, and also a good case-study for my 
whole argument, is Mill’s pronouncements on women’s rights, 
particularly a comparison of what he says in On Marriage, in his 
correspondence with Auguste Comte on the question, and his 
deliberate silence about divorce in The Subjection of Women. 
The differences in his revealed opinions in these texts have even 
led to Mill being accused of dissembling (Raeder, 46-72).
4
 
However, I think a better understanding of his philosophy of 
persuasion makes what is occurring much clearer.  
 In Marriage (a private text meant only for the eyes of Har-
riet Taylor), Mill clearly declares that ‘[t]here is no natural ine-
quality between the sexes’, dismisses institutionalised sexism 
based on biological differences, and declares forthrightly in fa-
vour of divorce (Mill 1984a, 41-2 and 45). In his correspon-
dence with Comte, Mill seems willing to accept that it is possi-
ble that women are naturally incapable of as much intellectual 
achievement as men, though he emphasises the need for precau-
tion because women currently receive a very different education 
to men, and says the question of divorce is ‘indécise’ (Mill 
1963d, 564). In Subjection, Mill dismisses the idea that female 
inequality can be justified by biological differences, and refuses 
to be drawn on the question of divorce (Mill 1984b, 285). This 
                                                         
4
 Similarly, Hamburger accuses Mill’s use of rhetoric of being ‘intended to 
disguise, conceal, equivocate, and mislead’ (Hamburger 1999, 203). I think, 
however, that this is to misinterpret Mill’s project.  
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apparent inconsistency can, however, I feel, be solved by a 
proper understanding of Mill’s philosophy of persuasion. 
 Given the context of Marriage—Mill was writing pri-
vately to someone of at-least equally feminist views and was, 
moreover, potentially engaged in trying to persuade her to leave 
her husband—it seems plausible to think Mill was at his most 
open in it (Robson, lx). On the other hand, Mill was in an en-
tirely different position when he published Subjection, with 
which he was intending to bring about a particular political 
act—the granting of the suffrage to women. Given this particu-
lar political goal—and given also the extreme radicalism of sup-
port for divorce at the time—it seems Mill would have very 
good reasons for leaving his opinions on divorce out of the 
question (and perhaps also, in his apparent reassurance to men 
that women will still choose to be housewives and mothers if 
they are given equal political rights, for refusing to reject the 
idea that woman’s ‘nature’ is the same as men’s, though he does 
tackle the question of biology being a good foundation for deny-
ing women any political rights at all) (Mill 1984a, 285 and 297-
8). Thus, if I am right about his philosophy of persuasion, we 
can see Mill in Subjection tackling contemporary ideas about 
women still in a radical fashion, but often from premises his au-
dience have already accepted (about the nature of marriage as a 
loving partnership, for instance), but holding back on the full 
extent of his radicalism, as this would merely alienate his audi-
ence (Urbinati, 640). Rather than being dishonest in Subjection, 
therefore, Mill is merely leaving out of the debate ideas which 
will not help him bring his audience to new, authentic ideas 
which will prompt them to a desired action (pressurising the 
government to grant women equal rights).  
 Something similar is, I think, occurring in Mill’s corre-
spondence with Comte, in which Mill expressed indecision on 
opinions that, at home, he evidently expressed more firmly 
(Taylor, 337). The correspondence, although ostensibly private 
was written, at least on Mill’s part, it would seem, with an eye to 
posterity and possible publication (Mill 1963e, 540; Rosen, 98). 
This would be one good reason for Mill not revealing all his 
opinions, for much the same reasons as it was when he was pub-
lishing Subjection (though in this case, Mill’s goal would not be 
the emancipation of women, but the wider acceptance of positiv-
ism, and striking a blow against ‘metaphysical’ philosophy, an-
other cause very close to his heart).  
 Moreover, even without having an eye on potential future 
publication, there are other good reasons for Mill not to enter 
into an antagonistic debate with Comte. It was very important 
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for Comte—and I think also for Mill—that they agreed (Rosen, 
12 and 101-109). Initially, this may have been mainly due to 
Mill’s feelings of respect, admiration and deference for Comte. 
Moreover, the positivist project was an important one for Mill, 
both, as Rosen points out, because it would help him in his bat-
tle against ‘metaphysical’ philosophy, and also, I think, because 
positivism was—in name and nature—the opposite of the ‘nega-
tive’ philosophy of the Enlightenment which, for Mill, epito-
mised the ‘critical’ age, and which was, as outlined above, pre-
venting society from entering into a new, better, organic age 
(ibid.). In addition, Mill and Comte were engaged in what was, 
for Mill, a vital discussion about the nature of sociology and 
logic; the possibility of Mill’s projected ‘ethology’ and the intel-
lectual position of political economy: the question of Comte’s 
position on women may have seemed peripheral when so much 
else was at stake, and it would certainly not be worth jeopardis-
ing the whole positivist project by antagonising Comte (who 
was, after all, rather easy to antagonise) (ibid.). Mill, then, had 
several imperative reasons for trying to persuade Comte to au-
thentically change his opinions to become closer to Mill’s, with-
out antagonising him—a perfect situation for the deployment of 
Mill’s new philosophy of persuasion. If we see Mill deploying 
this philosophy, then what we find in the correspondence is not 
Mill changing his mind on feminist issues, or being inconsistent, 
but an attempt on Mill’s part to persuade Comte without antago-




5. Conclusion: Mill’s philosophy of persuasion 
 
In this article I have endeavoured to show that any attempt to 
understand Mill’s work after 1826/7, and thus the period in 
which all his important works were written, needs to take cogni-
sance of the fact that most of the texts we may want to study are 
persuasive texts, and that Mill had a very specific, and individ-
ual philosophy of persuasion. Importantly, this philosophy of 
persuasion was concerned to bring people to a better under-
standing of their own point of view, and then to incrementally 
change that point of view until they not only held better opin-
ions, but held those opinions authentically. In order to bring 
about this incremental, authentic, change, Mill abandoned his 
earlier practice of argumentative debate, in which other people’s 
opinions were picked apart and proved wrong or irrational (or 
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both), and one attempted to replace these erroneous ideas with 
one’s own logical arguments, which people were forced to ac-
cept simply because they could not deny the truth of them. 
Rather, he sought to reveal only so much of his own beliefs as 
would be usefully challenging to public opinion—‘usefully’ 
here meaning either having a chance of being accepted after 
some thought, or of at least bringing people to slightly better 
opinions without appearing so opposing and argumentative as to 
make people cling to their erroneous beliefs through misplaced 
pride.  
 As well as explaining Mill’s previous theory of persua-
sion, what he felt was wrong with it after his ‘crisis’, and what 
new method he adopted after 1826/7, I have also endeavoured to 
give an example of how employing this understanding of what 
Mill is doing can change our reading of his work in an examina-
tion of some of his apparent inconsistencies on feminism. My 
conclusion, however, has a wider implication than this one ex-
ample, for I hope that I have shown that the realisation that this 
is how Mill chose to argue, coupled with the fact that almost all 
of his texts are persuasive, means that we need to bear in mind 
who Mill considered to be his audience, what change he might 
have been trying to bring about, and the context within which he 
was arguing (which reveals how radical he could afford to be) 
whenever we read any of Mill’s works. As I said at the very start 
of this article, the immediate content of Mill’s writing after 
1826/7 does not reveal everything about his political theory, and 
cannot be all we consider when assessing his political, social 
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